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Abstract
We present strong attacks against quantum key distribution schemes
which use quantum memories and quantum gates to attack directly the
final key. We analyze a specific attack of this type, for which we find
the density matrices available to the eavesdropper and the optimal
information which can be extracted from them. We prove security
against this attack and discuss security against any attack allowed by
the rules of quantum mechanics.
PACS number(s): 03.65.Bz, 89.70, 89.80
Quantum cryptography [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] uses quantum mechanics to perform
new cryptographic tasks — especially information secure key distributions —
which are beyond the abilities of classical cryptography. Unfortunately, the
security of such a key is still unproven: Sophisticated attacks (called coherent
or joint attacks) which are directed against the final key were suggested; The
analysis of such attacks is very complicated, and, by the time this work was
submitted, security against them was proven only in the non-realistic case of
ideal (error-free) channels [6, 7]. The security in the real case, which is crucial
for making quantum cryptography practical, is commonly believed but yet
unproven. A proof of security must bound the information available to the
eavesdropper (traditionally called Eve), on the final key, to be negligible
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(i.e., much smaller than one bit). A protocol is considered secure if the
adversary is restricted only by the rules of quantum mechanics, and a protocol
is considered practical if the legitimate users are restricted to use existing
technology. In this work we obtain the strongest security result for practical
protocols. We suggest collective attacks (simpler than the joint attacks) which
are simple enough to be analyzed, but are general enough to imply (or at
least suggest) the security against any attack. We prove security against the
simplest collective attack: we generalize methods developed in [8] in order to
calculate Eve’s density matrices explicitly, and to find the information which
can be obtained from them; we show that it is negligible. Our result also
provides better understanding of the issue of information splitting between
two parties which is a fundamental problem in quantum information theory.
Parts of this work were done together with Dominic Mayers.
In any quantum key distribution scheme, the sender, Alice, sends to the
receiver, Bob, a classical string of bits by encoding them as quantum states.
In the two-state scheme [2] (B92 scheme) a classical bit is represented by ei-
ther of two non-orthogonal pure states, which can be written as ψ0 =
(
cos θ
sin θ
)
,
and ψ1 =
(
cos θ
− sin θ
)
. Bob performs a test which provides him with a conclusive
or inconclusive result. For instance, he can test whether a specific parti-
cle is in a state ψ0 or a state orthogonal to it ψ0
′; A result ψ0 is treated
as inconclusive and a result ψ0
′ is identified as ψ1. Alice and Bob use also
an unjammable classical channel to inform which bits were identified con-
clusively, and to compare some of the common bits in order to estimate the
error-rate. They must accept some small error-rate pe due to imperfections in
creating, transmitting and receiving of the quantum states. If the estimated
error-rate exceeds the allowed error-rate they quit the transmission and do
not use the data, thus any eavesdropping attempt is severely constrained to
induce an error-rate smaller than pe. Alice and Bob are now left with similar
n-bit strings which contain errors. They randomize the order of the bits and
correct the errors using any error-correction code [9]. The error-correction
code is usually made of r parities of substrings (where the parity bit p(x) of
a binary string x is zero if there is even number of 1’s in x, and one other-
wise). Alice sends these parities to Bob (using the classical channel), who
uses them to obtain a (possibly shorter) string identical to Alice’s, up to an
exponentially small error probability. Finally, Alice and Bob can amplify the
security of the final key by using privacy amplification techniques [10]: by
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choosing some parity bits of substrings to be the final key. Their aim is to
derive a final key on which Eve’s average information is negligible.
Eve can measure some of the particles and gain a lot of information on
them, but this induces a lot of error. Hence, she can attack only a small por-
tion of the particles, and this reduces her information on the parity of many
bits exponentially to zero. Translucent attacks [11] are much more powerful:
Eve attaches a probe to each particle and performs some unitary transfor-
mation, after which her probe is correlated to the transmitted state. In the
case where each probe is left in a pure state [11], and measured separately to
obtain information on Alice’s bit, it is a rather obvious conclusion (from [10])
that privacy amplification is still effective. Thus, such an individual translu-
cent attack is ineffective. We deal with a much more sophisticated attack
in which Eve’s measurement is done after the processes of error-correction
and privacy amplification are completed. Privacy amplification techniques
were not designed to stand against such attacks, hence their efficiency against
them is yet unknown. Consider the following collective attack: (1) Eve at-
taches a separate, uncorrelated probe to each transmitted particle using a
translucent attack. (2) Eve keeps the probes in a quantum memory (where
non-orthogonal quantum states can be kept for long time [5]) till receiving
all classical data including error-correction and privacy amplification data.
(3) Eve performs the optimal measurement on her probes in order to learn
the maximal information on the final key. The case in which Eve attaches
one probe (in a large-dimensional Hilbert-space) to all transmitted particles
is called a joint or coherent attack [4], and it is the most general possible
attack. No specific joint attacks were yet suggested; the collective attack
defined above is the strongest joint attack suggested so far, and there are
good reasons to believe that it is the strongest possible attack.
The security of quantum cryptography is very complicated and tricky
problem. Several security claims done in the past were found later on to
contain loopholes. Recently, we become aware of three new such claims [12,
13, 14]. We hope that these approaches, together with our approach really
produce the solution; yet it is important to have them all, since each of them
has different advantages.
Our approach deals with error-correction and privacy amplification, by
calculating the density matrices which are available to the eavesdropper by
the time all data transmissions (classical and quantum) are completed. We
provide an example of collective attacks based on the “translucent attack
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without entanglement” of [11], which leave Eve with probes in a pure state,
and we prove security against them. These attacks use the unitary trans-
formation
(
cos θ
± sin θ
)
−→
(
cos θ′
± sin θ′
)(
cosα
± sinα
)
with ‘+’ for ψ0, and ‘−’ for ψ1, where
θ′ is the angle of the states received by Bob, and α is the angle of the
states in Eve’s hand. The error-rate, pe = sin
2(θ − θ′), is the probabil-
ity that Alice sent ψ0 and Bob measured ψ
′
0. The connection between this
induced error-rate and the angle α is calculated using the unitarity condi-
tion [11] cos 2θ = cos 2θ′ cos 2α. For weak attacks which causes small error-
rate the angle of Eve’s probe satisfies α = (pe tan
2 2θ)1/4, which is (pe)
1/4
for θ = 22.5 deg. In our case, the same translucent attack is performed on
all the bits, and it leaves Eve with n probes, each in one of the two states(
c
±s
)
, with c = cosα and s = sinα. As result, Eve holds an n bits string
x which is concatenated from its bits (x)1 (x)2 . . . (x)n. For simplicity, we
choose the final key to consist of one bit, which is the parity of the n bits.
Eve wants to distinguish between two density matrices corresponding to the
two possible values of this parity bit. Our aim is to calculate the optimal
mutual information she can extract from them.
For our analysis we need some more notations. Let nˆ(x) be the number
of 1’s in x. For two strings of equal length x ⊙ y is the bitwise “AND”, so
that the bit (x ⊙ y)i is one if both (x)i and (y)i are one. Also x ⊕ y is the
bitwise “XOR”, so that (x ⊕ y)i is zero if (x)i and (y)i are the same. For k
(independent) strings, v1 . . . vk, of equal length let the set {v}k contain the
2k linear combinations (v1), . . . , (vk), (v1⊕v1), (v1⊕v2), . . . , (v1⊕v2 . . .⊕vk).
If these strings are not all different, then the original k strings are linearly
dependent. The quantum state of a string is the tensor product
ψx =
(
c
±s
)(
c
±s
)
. . .
(
c
±s
)
=


ccc . . . ccc
±ccc . . . ccs
. . .
±sss . . . sss

 , (1)
leaving in a 2n dimensional Hilbert space. The sign of the i’th bit (in the
middle expression) is plus for (x)i = 0 and minus for (x)i = 1. The sign
of the j’th term (j = 0 . . . 2n−1) in the expression at the right depends on
the parity of the string x⊙ j and is equal to (−1)p(x⊙j). The density matrix
ρx = ψxψ
T
x also has for any x, the same terms up to the signs. We denote
the absolute values by ρjk ≡ |(ρx)jk|. The sign of each term (ρx)jk is given
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by
(−1)p(x⊙j)(−1)p(x⊙k) = (−1)p[x⊙(j⊕k)] . (2)
A priori, all strings are equally probable and Eve needs to distinguish
between the two density matrices describing the parities. These matrices
were calculated and analyzed in [8] (henceforth, the BMS work), and inde-
pendently in [15] for the case α = pi/4. In case Eve is being told what the
error-correction code is, all strings consistent with the given error-correction
code (the r sub-parities) are equally probable, and Eve need to distinguish
between the two density matrices:
ρ
(n,r)
0 =
1
2n−r−1
∑
x | ( p(x)=0x OECC)
ρx ; ρ
(n,r)
1 =
1
2n−r−1
∑
x | ( p(x)=1x OECC)
ρx (3)
where “OECC” is a shortcut for obeys error-correction code. Let us look
at two simple examples where n = 5, one with r = 1 and the second with
r = 2. Suppose that the parity of the first two bits, (x)1 and (x)2, is p1 = 0.
Formally, this substring is described by the n-bit string v1 = 24 which is
11000 binary; The number of 1’s in the first two bits of a string x is given
by nˆ(x⊙ v1), and x obeys the error-correction code if p(x⊙ v1) = p1. Let vd
be the binary string (11111 in this case) which describes the substring of the
desired parity. Eve could perform the optimal attack on the three bits which
are left, or in general, on v1 ⊕ vd. For any such case, the optimal attack
is given by the BMS work and the optimal information depends only on
nˆ(v1 ⊕ vd), the Hamming distance between the two words. This information
(using eq. 53 of the BMS work) is
I(nˆ) = c
(
2k
k
)
α2k (4)
with c = 1 for even nˆ (which equals to 2k) and c = 1/ln2 for odd nˆ (that is
nˆ = 2k − 1). Suppose that Eve gets another parity bit p2 = 1 of the binary
string 01100 (v2 = 12). Now, a string x obeys the error-correction code if it
also obeys p(x⊙ v2) = p2. Clearly, it also satisfies p[x⊙ (v1 ⊕ v2)] = p1 ⊕ p2.
In the general case there are r independent parity strings, and 2r parity
strings in the set {v}r. The BMS result cannot be directly used but still
provides some intuition: For each word (i.e., each parity string) vl ∈ {v}r,
let I(nˆ(vl⊕vd)) be the optimal information Eve could obtain using eq. 4. Also
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let Isum be the sum of these contributions from all such words. In reality Eve
cannot obtain Isum since each measurement changes the state of the measured
bits, hence we expect that Isum bounds her optimal information Itotal from
above: Itotal < Isum. On the other hand, Eve knows all these words at once,
and could take advantage of it, thus we leave this as an unproven conjecture.
In the following we find an explicit way to calculate exactly the optimal
information. However, this exact result requires cumbersome calculations,
thus it is used only to verify the conjecture for short strings.
The parity of the full string is also known since the density matrix ρ(n,r+1)
corresponds to either ρ
(n,r)
0 or ρ
(n,r)
1 depending on the desired parity pr+1,
thus we add the string vr+1 = vd. There are r + 1 independent sub-parities
altogether, hence 2r+1 parity strings in the set {v}r+1. A string x is included
in ρ(n,r+1) if p[x ⊙ vl] = pl for all given substring in {v}r+1. In the BMS
work (where r = 0) the parity density matrices were put in a block diagonal
form of 2n−1 blocks of size 2 × 2. This result can be generalized to the case
where r parities of substrings are given. There will be 2n−r−1 blocks of size
2r+1× 2r+1. We shall show that the (jk)’th term in a density matrix ρ(n,r+1)
of r+1 sub-parities is either zero, ρjk or −ρjk, that is, either all the relevant
strings contribute exactly the same term, or half of them cancels the other
half. The proof can be skipped in a first reading.
Theorem
The element (ρ(n,r+1))jk is zero if j ⊕ k 6∈ {v}r+1, and it is ±ρjk if
j ⊕ k ∈ {v}r+1.
Proof
In case j ⊕ k 6∈ {v}r+1 choose C such that
p[C ⊙ vl] = 0 with all (vl)’s in {v}r+1 and
p[C⊙(j⊕k)] = 1 (many such C’s exists since C has n independent bits
and it need to fulfill only r + 2 constraints). For such a C and for any
x which obeys the error-correction code there exist one (and only one)
y, y = x⊕C, which also obeys the code (due to the first demand) but
has the opposite sign in the jk’th element (due to the second demand),
so (ρy)jk = −(ρx)jk. Since this is true for any relevant x, we obtain
(ρ(n,r+1))jk = 0.
In case j ⊕ k ∈ {v}r+1 such C cannot exists, and all terms must have
the same sign: Suppose that there are two terms, x and y with op-
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posite signs. Then C = x ⊕ y satisfies the two demands, leading to a
contradiction.
This theorem tells us the place of all non-vanishing terms in the original
ordering. The matrices can be reordered to a block-diagonal form by ex-
changes of the basis vectors. We group the vectors s, s⊕v1, etc., for all (vl)’s
in {v}r+1 to be one after the other, so each such group is separated from
the other groups. Now the theorem implies that all non-vanishing terms are
grouped in blocks, and all vanishing terms are outside these blocks. As result
the matrix is block-diagonal. This forms 2n−r−1 blocks of size 2r+1 × 2r+1.
All terms inside the blocks and their signs are given by eq. 1 and 2 respec-
tively up to reordering. The organization of the blocks depends only on the
parity strings vl and not on the parities pl, thus, ρ
(n,r)
0 and ρ
(n,r)
1 are block
diagonalized in the same basis. The rank of a density matrix is the number
of (independent) pure states which form it, and it is 2n−r−1 in case of the par-
ity matrices (eq. 3). When these matrices are put in a block diagonal form,
there are 2n−r−1 (all non-zero) blocks. Thus, the rank of each block is one,
the corresponding state is pure, and, when diagonalized, the non-vanishing
term aj in the j’th block is the probability that a measurement will result in
this block.
In the BMS work (r = 0), the information, in case of small angle, was
found to be exponentially small with the length of the string. When each
probe is in a pure state, this result can be generalized to r > 0 as follows: The
optimal mutual information carried by two pure states (in any dimension)
is well known. The two possible pure states in the j’th block of ρ
(n,r)
0 and
ρ
(n,r)
1 can be written as
(
cos β
± sinβ
)
. The optimal mutual information which
can be obtained from the j’th block is given by the overlap (the angle βj)
Ij = 1 + pj log pj + (1 − pj)log(1 − pj), where pj = 1−sin 2βj2 ; The overlap is
calculated using eq. 1 and 2. Thus, for any given error-correction code, we
can find the two pure states in each block, the optimal information Ij , and
finally, the total information Itotal =
∑
j ajIj. We did not use the value of
vd in the proof, and thus, the final key could be the parity of any substring.
Moreover, a similar method can be used to analyze keys of several bits which
can be formed from parities of several substrings.
We wrote a computer program which receives any (short) error-correction
code and calculates the total information as a function of the angle α between
the pure states of the individual probes. We checked many short codes (up
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to n = 8) to verify whether Itotal < Isum as we conjectured. Indeed, all our
checks showed that the conjecture holds. The information for small angle
α is bounded by Isum = Cα
2k as previously explained, where C is given by
summing the terms which contribute to the highest order of eq. 4, and the
Hamming distance nˆ (which is 2k or 2k − 1), can be increased by choosing
longer codes to provide any desired level of security.
In addition to a desirable security level, the error-correction code must
provide also a desirable reliability; A complete analysis must include also
estimation of the probability pf that Alice and Bob still has wrong (i.e.
different) final key. For enabling such analysis, one must use known error-
correction codes. Random Linear Codes allow for such analysis but cannot
be used efficiently by Alice and Bob. Hamming codes [9], Hr which use r
given parities for correcting one error in strings of length n = 2r−1, have an
efficient decoding/encoding procedure and a simple way to calculate pf . An
Hamming code has 2r words in {v}r, all of them, except 00 . . . 0, are at the
same distance nˆ = 2r−1 − 1 from vd. Using our conjecture and eq. 4 (with
k = nˆ+1
2
= 2r−2) we obtain Itotal < (2
r− 1) 1
ln 2
(
2r−1
2r−2
)
α(2
r−1)+O
(
α(2
r−1)
)
. For
r = 3 (n = 7) this yields Itotal < 60.6α
4. The exact calculation done using
our computer program also gives the same result, showing that the conjecture
provides an extremely tight bound in this case. Using
(
2r−1
2r−2
)
< 2
(2r−1)√
(pi
2
2r−1)
and
some calculation we finally obtain
Itotal <

 2
ln 2
√
pi
2

√2r−1(2α)(2r−1) , (5)
bounding Itotal to be exponentially small with n [which follows from 2
r−1 =
(n+ 1)/2].
The rate of errors in the string shared by Alice and Bob (after throwing
inconclusive results) is the normalized error-rate, p
(N)
e = pe/(pc + pe), where
pc = sin(θ+θ
′) is the probability of obtaining a correct and conclusive result.
For small α it is p
(N)
e =
2pe
sin2 2θ
= 2 cos
2 2θ
sin4 2θ
α4. The final error probability pf is
given by the probability to have more than one error in the initial string, since
the code corrects one error. It is pf =
n(n−1)
2
(p
(N)
e )
2 + O[(np
(N)
e )
3], showing
that we can use the Hamming codes as long as np
(N)
e << 1. In case it is not,
better codes such as the BCH codes [9] (which correct more than one error)
are required, but their analysis is beyond the goals of this paper.
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In conclusion, we presented new attacks on quantum key distribution
schemes, directed against the final key, and we proved security against a
specific one. This result, together with its extension to the analysis of probes
in mixed state [16], suggest that the optimal information obtained by the
optimal collective attack shall still show the same behavior as shown in our
example. Let us explain the intuition that the security against collective
attacks implies security against any joint attack: Most of the transmitted
particles are not part of the n-bits string. The correlations between the n
bits (as specified by the error-correction and privacy amplification) as well
as the random reordering of the bits are not known in advance. It is very
reasonable that Eve can only lose by searching for such correlations when
the particles are transmitted through her. Thus, the best she can do is probe
the particles via the the best collective attack.
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and the Universite´ de Montre´al for hosting a productive meeting, which had
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